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COMMENT
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 2518
DISCLAIMERS AND THE 1981 ECONOMIC
RECOVERY TAX ACT: CONTINUED UNEQUAL
TREATMENT OF TAXPAYERS
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the purposes of estate planning is to decrease or
eliminate federal and state taxes by distributing family wealth
to meet family members' needs.1 Disclaimers2 can play an im-
portant role in estate distributions particularly where the ben-
eficiaries' circumstances have changed since the formulation
of the original estate plan.3 A disclaimer is a refusal to accept
ownership of either a testamentary or inter vivos gift or an
intestate share.' The disclaimed property is treated as if it
had never been transferred to the person making the dis-
claimer.5 Instead, it is considered to pass directly from the
original transferor to the person entitled to receive the prop-
erty as a result of the disclaimer. Consequently, there is no
federal gift tax levied on a property transfer that results from
a qualified disclaimer.'
© 1982 by Emma Pefia
1. See, e.g., Berall, Using Disclaimers Effectively: An Analysis of a Useful
Postmortem Tax Planning Tool, 34 J. TAX'N 92 (1971); Frimmer, Using Disclaimers
in Postmortem Estate Planning: 1976 Law Leaves Unresolved Issues, 48 J. TAX'N
322 (1978); Schwartz, Effective Use of Disclaimers: Frustrating the Planner and
Federal Tax Policy, 19 B.C.L. Rav. 551 (1979); Note, Disclaimer Statutes: New Fed-
eral and State Tools for Postmortem Estate Planning, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 42 (1980);
Comment, How to Look a Gift Horse in the Mouth-Disclaimers Under California
Law and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 18 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 217 (1978).
2. The words "disclaimer" and "renunciation" are used interchangeably by the
courts and in state disclaimer statutes. See Frimmer, Disclaimers After the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976: Chaos Out of Disorder, 31 S. CAL. TAx. INST. 811, 812 (1979) (citing
state statutes which use the words interchangeably); 7 B. WrrIuN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAW §§ 37-38, at 5560-63 (8th ed. 1974).
3. See Note, supra note 1, at 46-47; Schwartz, supra note 1.
4. CONTINUING EDUC. O THE BAR, EST. PLAN. & PROB. REP., Dec. 1980, at 21.
5. I.R.C. § 2518(a) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1972).
6. See I.R.C. § 2518 (1976). The net tax savings to beneficiaries may also in-
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A hypothetical situation illustrates the usefulness of a
disclaimer in the area of postmortem estate planning. Suppose
testator T dies in 1982 and is survived by two sons, B and C,
and B's children. T leaves equal shares in certain income pro-
ducing property to B and C. Additional property is left in
trust to B with the trustee authorized to pay the income to B
and B's children. At B's death, the remaining trust assets are
to be distributed to B's children. B, a successful doctor with
sufficient assets for security and comfort, desires to limit his
estate and decrease his income taxes. B would prefer that his
property interests, inherited from T, pass to his children7 and
his brother C,' who became incompetent immediately follow-
ing T's death. If B's inherited property interests can be val-
idly disclaimed, he can successfully reduce his estate size,9
avoid a generation-skipping tax,'0 minimize the family's in-
come taxes," and equalize the family estates. 2
clude state inheritance and succession taxes. Some states, California for example, re-
quire that the inheritance tax be paid by the disclaimant, but most states that allow
disclaimers do not assess the disclaimant with the inheritance tax. See Frimmer,
supra note 2, at 811; Newman & Kalter, The Need for Disclaimer Legislation-An
Analysis of the Background and Current Law, 28 A.B.A. TAx LAw. 571 (1975).
7. A disclaimant's property usually passes under the particular state's laws of
succession. Accordingly, B's disclaimed property interests in the trust will pass to his
children. See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
8. It must be assumed that a clause in the testator's will provides that in the
event B disclaims his interest in the nontrust assets, they are to pass to C. Otherwise,
they would pass to B's children. See infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
9. In general, property owned by a decedent at the date of his death is taxed to
his estate. I.R.C. § 2033 (1976). By removing property from his estate before death, B
can reduce the potential future estate tax. The inter vivos transfer of property, how-
ever, usually results in a gift tax. I.R.C. § 2501 (1976 & Supp. 1980). By disclaiming
his property interests, B will also avoid the gift tax. See I.R.C. § 2518 (1976).
10. A trust established for the benefit of two or more generations below the
grantor is considered a "generation-skipping" trust. I.R.C. § 2613(b) (1976). Upon its
termination, a transfer tax is imposed. I.R.C. § 2601 (1976). A "taxable termination"
is defined as a termination by means of death, lapse of time, exercise or nonexercise,
or otherwise, of an interest in a generation-skipping trust of a younger generation
beneficiary. I.R.C. § 2613(b). A "younger generation beneficiary" is a beneficiary in
any generation below that of the grantor. I.R.C. § 2613(c). In the hypothetical, B is
not deemed to have an interest, therefore, there is no taxable termination for pur-
poses of section 2613(b) and no tax is imposed. If he waits to let the interest pass to
his children at death, however, a generation-skipping tax will be imposed. I.R.C. §
2613(b).
The right to refuse an offered gift was recognized in early common law. People v.
Flanagin, 331 II. 203, 207-08, 162 N.E. 848, 849-50 (1928); Burritt v. Silliman, 13
N.Y. 93 (1855); 60 A.L.R. 305 (1928).
11. Assume the children are in a lower tax bracket than B. If the property
passes to the children, the current income will be taxed at their lower income tax rate
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The tax implications of disclaiming property interests,
however, have not always been definitively ascertainable.
Analysis of the original version of Internal Revenue Code sec-
tion 2518 shows that state law has controlled disclaimer evalu-
ation.13 Therefore, disclaimants have received varying treat-
ment according to their place of domicile.' 4
as opposed to B's higher rate.
12. C, now incompetent, will not receive earnings which will increase his estate.
B is in a highly lucrative profession and his estate size will most likely increase. By
using a disclaimer, B is able to help meet C's support needs and distribute the family
wealth so that its respective estates are closer in size.
13. Section 2518 was enacted in 1976 and provided as follows:
(a) General rule
For purposes of this subtitle, if a person makes a qualified dis-
claimer with respect to any interest in property, this subtitle shall apply
with respect to such interest as if the interest had never been trans-
ferred to such person.
(b) Qualified disclaimer defined
For purposes of subsection (a), the term "qualified disclaimer"
means an irrevocable and unqualified refusal by a person to accept an
interest in property but only if-
(1) such refusal is in writing,
(2) such writing is received by the transferor of the interest, his
legal representative, or the holder of the legal title to the property to
which the interest relates not later than the date which is 9 months after
the later of-
(A) the day on which the transfer creating the interest in such
person is made, or
(B) the day on which such person attains age 21,
(3) such person has not accepted the interest or any of its benefits,
and
(4) as a result of such refusal, the interest passes to a person other
than the person making the disclaimer (without any direction on the
part of the person making the disclaimer).
(c) Other rules
For purposes of subsection (a)-
(1) Disclaimer of undivided portion of interest. A disclaimer with
respect to an undivided portion of interest which meets the require-
ments of the preceding sentence shall be treated as a qualified dis-
claimer of such portion of the interest.
(2) Power. A power with respect to property shall be treated as an
interest in such property.
Tax Reform Act of (1976), Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2518, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at
I.R.C. § 2518 (1976)).
Before the 1981 amendment, the section had been amended in 1978, altering sub-
section (b)(4) to read, "as a result of such refusal, the interest passes without any
direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer and passes either-(A) to
the spouse of the decedent, or (B) to a person other than the person making the
disclaimer." Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(m), (2), 92 Stat. 2763
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980)).
14. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
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Examination of the 1981 amendment, subsection
2518(c)(3), 1 discloses that deference to state law has been vir-
tually abandoned. The amendment has, thereby, achieved
uniformity in the application of disclaimers. The issue of un-
fair treatment of taxpayers, however, has not been entirely re-
solved. The IRS interpretation of section 2518 generates in-
consistencies within the statute which confer less favorable
treatment upon certain taxpayers. In addition, the amend-
ment fails to address differences between state and federal
law concerning determination of the proper post-disclaimer
transferee.
This comment focuses on whether I.R.C. section 2518 has
abrogated deference to state law in disclaimer application and
abolished the unequal treatment of taxpayers. It concludes
that the unfair treatment of taxpayers persists after the 1981
amendment to section 2518 and suggests that these inequities
may be eliminated by the following: (1) alteration of the pro-
posed IRS interpretation of section 2518; (2) designation of
testator post-disclaimer transferees; and (3) passage of state
legislation parallel to that of the federal statute.
II. COMMON LAW INCONSISTENCIES
Problems in utilizing disclaimers arise only where state
and federal law are inconsistent. 16 These inconsistencies are a
product of the common law, and, therefore, examination of
their development is pertinent in order to lay the new law's
foundation.
At common law, the states were allowed to determine the
validity of a disclaimer.17 State property law determined when
15. The 1981 amendment to § 2518 provides as follows:
(c) Other rules.-For purposes of subsection (a)-
(3) Certain transfers treated as disclaimers.-For purposes of sub-
section (a), a written transfer of the transferor's entire interest in the
property-
(A) which meets requirements similar to the requirements of
paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b), and
(B) which is to a person or persons who would have received the
property had the transferor made a qualified disclaimer (within the
meaning of subsection (b)), shall be treated as a qualified disclaimer.
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 456, 95 Stat. 318 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (West Supp. 1981)).
16. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
17. Treas. Reg. § 2 5.2511-(1)(c) (1973). See also supra note 2, at 1.
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a property interest vested' s and, consequently, when it had
been accepted. State probate law controlled the postmortem
passage of property and designated the person to whom the
interest would pass.1' The issue of whether a disclaimer was a
taxable event hinged upon whether the disclaimant held title
to the property interest before the purported disclaimer. If
state law deemed property title to have vested in the disclaim-
ant the post-disclaimer transfer would then result in a gift
tax. Otherwise, no tax consequences would arise.
Of course, state laws varied. Differences existed with re-
spect to the vesting of intestate and testate shares20 and par-
tial interests.2" It was unclear whether joint ownership inter-
ests,22 life insurance and annuity contract proceeds, and
beneficial interests combined with fiduciary obligations could
be proper disclaimer subjects.s To add to the confusion, no
definitive period for a timely disclaimer was established."
The resulting unequal treatment of taxpayers at common
law is best illustrated by two cases. In Brown v. Routzhan,2 '
18. See Wartin, Perspective on Federal Disclaimer Legislation, 46 U. CHI. L.
REv. 323-25 (1979).
19. Id. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 200-59.2 (West 1956).
20. Compare Hardenberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1952) (attempted renunciation of intestacy interest was held to
be a taxable transfer) with Brown v. Routzhan, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933) (renuncia-
tion of a testamentary transfer was upheld even though the disclaimant had delayed
eight years in renouncing his interest).
21. See Commissioner v. Macaulay's Estate, 150 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945) (up-
holding a renunciation of $400,000 out of a $1,000,000 bequest and allowing a charita-
ble deduction for the amount disclaimed which passed to charities according to the
terms of the residuary clause); Brown v. Routzhan, 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933) (the
court treated a one-third interest in a life estate as a severable interest); Perrine v.
United States, 423 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (N.D. Iowa 1976) (electing under a will does
not estop a surviving spouse from disclaiming an interest under one of the
provisions).
Other states take an all or nothing approach. "The 'all or nothing' concept is
based on the theory that a will must be accepted as a whole and liabilities must be
accepted with benefits." Note, supra note 1, at 52 (citing Nusz v. Nusz, 155 Kan. 699,
127 P.2d 441 (1942)).
22. See Note, supra note 1, at 52 (citing Krakoff v. United States, 493 F.2d
1023 (6th Cir. 1971) (involving joint bank accounts for which the survivor had signed
cards and stock certificates for which she had endorsed dividend checks)).
23. See Comment, supra note 1, at 225-27; Frimmer, supra note 2, at 829-33.
24. Tress. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1973); see Keinath v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 57
(8th Cir. 1973); Ewing v. Rountree, 228 F. Supp. 137 (D. Tenn. 1964); In re Wilson's
Estate, 298 N.Y. 393, 83 N.E.2d 852 (1949).
25. 63 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1933), rev'g 58 F.2d 329 (D.C.N. Ohio 1931), cert. de-
nied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the Sixth Circuit confirmed that state law was controlling in
the determination of a valid disclaimer .2  The court allowed
for renunciation of a testamentary share despite the delay of
eight years."7 In contrast, intestate shares were not subject to
disclaimers. In Hardenberg v. Commissioner,2 the Eighth
Circuit applied the state's descent and distribution statute
and concluded that title to intestate property vested in the
heirs immediately at the decedent's death. As a result, the
heirs could not divest themselves of the interest without in-
curring a federal gift tax.'0
In addition to these common law inequities, no specific
disclaimer time period was prescribed. The greatest contro-
versy arose in the case of Keinath v. Commissioner." The
Eighth Circuit held that disclaimer of a remainder interest
made at the expiration of the life estate was timely under
both federal and state law, despite the lapse of nineteen years
since the estate's creation. The court decided that the tolling
period for a remainder interest did not begin to run until the
interest became indefeasibly vested.31
The preceding decisions failed to alleviate the confu-
sion.32 The distinction made by Brown and Hardenberg be-
tween intestate and testate shares had no logical basis, and
the courts failed to clearly define disclaimer "timeliness."
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit in Keinath did not establish an
unequivocal future interest tolling period, even though it de-
cided when that tolling period would begin to run.3' Perhaps
the most innovative implication of the Keinath court was that
26. A disclaimant was allowed to renounce his outright one-third interest in his
deceased wife's property approximately eight years after her death. The district court
held that the husband's acceptance of the income from the property and his delay in
rejecting its benefits precluded his renunciation. 63 F.2d at 916. The Sixth Circuit
reversed holding that the right to accept or reject the testamentary gift could be exer-
cised as long as the decedent's estate was in administration. Id. at 917.
27. Id. at 916.
28. 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
29. Id. at 68.
30. 480 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 58 T.C. 352 (1972).
31. The court's holding that the tolling of the period does not begin to run until
the interest becomes indefeasibly vested was contrary to the IRS position that the
period should begin to run upon creation of the interest. Since in this case the inter-
est had become indefeasibly vested at the death of the life tenant, petitioner had
made an effective disclaimer. 480 F.2d at 64.
32. Id. at 62.
33. Id. at 64. The court concluded that six months was "timely" once the tolling
period began to run but that nineteen years was not.
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federal law had a role to play in the determination of a dis-
claimer's validity.3 4 I.R.C. section 2518 was enacted in re-
sponse to the common law inconsistencies to establish a uni-
form federal standard for judging disclaimer effectiveness.
III. I.R.C. SECTION 2518
I.R.C. section 2518, part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,"8
was enacted to eliminate submission to the vagaries of state
law. Congress was unsuccessful in achieving this goal, how-
ever, because the language of the 1976 statute mandated ap-
plication of state law. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
198186 amended section 2518 and rendered state law irrelevant
in effective disclaimer determination by providing a method
for transferring disclaimed property to an alternate transferee:
A. Original Section 2518 Requirements Still Applicable
Section 2518 defines a "qualified disclaimer" as an "irrev-
ocable and unqualified refusal to accept an interest in prop-
erty"87 that satisfies the following four conditions: (1) The re-
fusal must be in writing;8 (2) the refusal must be received by
the person transferring the property, or his legal representa-
tive, no later than nine months after creation of the interest
or after the disclaimant reaches age twenty-one;3 ' (3) no inter-
est or benefits in the transferred property may have been ac-
cepted prior to the disclaimer;40 and (4) as a result of the dis-
claimer, the interest must pass either to the testator's
surviving spouse 1 or to a person other than the disclaimant
34. Id. at 61. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that a disclaimer
should not be assessed solely on the basis of its validity under local law.
35. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2518, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2518 (1976)).
36. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 456, 95 Stat. 318
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (West Supp. 1981)).
37. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (1976).
38. Id. at (b)(1).
39. Id. at (b)(2).
40. Id. at (b)(3).
41. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(m)(2) 92 Stat. 2763,
amended § 2518 (b)(4) to permit the interest disclaimed by the surviving spouse to
pass to the surviving spouse. The amendment allows disclaimed, overfunded marital
deduction bequests to pass to the family or bypass trust even though the spouse is
also a beneficiary of that trust. See Letter Ruling 7928054 (4-16-79) (disclaimer of the
above type was ruled a "qualified disclaimer").
1982] 1185
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without any disclaimant direction.42
The proposed IRS regulations,43 issued in 1980, elaborate
on the above requirements. The disclaimer writing must iden-
tify the disclaimed property interest and be signed either by
the disclaimant or his legal representative. Further, the reg-
ulations repeat the Committee Report guideline that the nine-
month disclaimer period is to be determined with reference to
each taxable transfer.45
Acceptance of property interests can be either express or
implied."' The payment of property taxes for instance, can be
deemed an implied acceptance.' 7 An agreement to have the
disclaimed property pass to the disclaimant's designee and re-
ceipt of consideration for making the disclaimer may also be
deemed an implied acceptance." For example, a disclaimant
may renounce an interest in a house but be allowed to live in
it rent free for life.4e The disclaimer may, in the alternative,
be conditioned on the receipt of the interest by the disclaim-
ant's designee.' 0 Both situations would result in an implied
property acceptance by the purported disclaimant. The exer-
cise of a power of appointment may also be regarded as an
acceptance. Actions taken by a person in the exercise of his
fiduciary powers to maintain and preserve the disclaimed
property, however, will not result in an acceptance.8 '
The most important section 2518 requirement is con-
tained in subsection (b)(4), which states that the interest
must "pass without direction on the part of the disclaim-
42. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(4) (1976).
43. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518 (1980). Comments on the proposed regula-
tions were heard on November 18, 1980. These comments attacked the IRS position.
The final regulations may reflect changes which are of concern to the estate planning
community. See American Bankers Association, Request for opportunity to testify at
public hearing, (10-15-80); Michael D. Carrico, Comments on the proposed regula-
tions (10-29-80); Paul N. Frimmer, Outline of oral comments on the proposed regula-
tions under § 2518, (10-30-80); Robert A. Parr, Written comments on the proposed
regulations pertaining to a qualified disclaimer, (9-19-80). The above comments and
outlines may be obtained from the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service and
are also on file with Santa Clara Law Review.
44. § 25.2518-2(b)(1).
45. Id. at (c)(2).
46. Id. at (d)(1)(i).
47. Id. at (d)(1)(iii) example 3.
48. Id. at (d)(1)(i).
49. Id. at (d)(1)(iii) example 2.




ant.""2 First, the property interest must not remain in the dis-
claimant's possession or control.5 8 Otherwise, the "pass" re-
quirement will not have been met. Second, the disclaimant
cannot designate who will take the property in his or her
stead. 4 In the introductory hypothetical situation, if B were
to specify that his interest must pass to his children, B would
violate the "without direction" requirement and the dis-
claimer would fail.
The federal statute, as originally enacted, failed to supply
a mechanism for subsequent disposition of disclaimed prop-
erty.55 The statute on its face did not direct how the interest
would pass and to whom. In the hypothetical situation, B
wanted to disclaim his respective interests to obtain beneficial
tax results. How would the effectiveness of B's disclaimer be
determined?
The proposed section 2518 regulations indicated that
state law would continue to govern disclaimer validity. "If a
disclaimer is not effective under local law to divest ownership
of the disclaimed property in the disclaimant and to vest it in
another, the disclaimer is not a qualified disclaimer under sec-
tion 2518. ''15 This appeared to be the only logical conclusion
in spite of congressional intent to the contrary.5 7
The federal statute was devoid of any language directing
the subsequent property transfer.5 8 In comparison, most states
52. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4).
53. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(e)(1).
54. Id. A disclaimer will not result if the disclaimant directs, either alone or
with another person, the redistribution or transfer of property. Id. at (e)(1)(i). The
disclaimer will be unqualified if the property passes to or for the benefit of the dis-
claimant, with the exception of the surviving spouse, as a result of the disclaimer. Id.
at (e)(1)(ii) & (e)(2). A disclaimant must then be aware of any interest that he might
possibly retain in the property being disclaimed. He should be certain to disclaim all
beneficial interests which may be applicable to him. See Frimmer, supra note 2, at
851.
55. I.R.C. § 2518 (1976).
56. Proposed 'Treas. Reg. § 2518-1(c)(1) (1980).
57. The House Committee on Ways and Means reported as follows:
If the requirements of the provision are satisfied, a refusal to accept
property is to be given effect for federal estate and gift tax purposes
even if the applicable local law does not technically characterize the re-
fusal as a 'disclaimer' if the person refusing the property was considered
to have been the owner of the legal title to the property before refusing
acceptance of the property.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWs. 3356, 3421.
58. The 1981 amendment, § 2518(c)(3), does provide for the devolution of prop-
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have statutes that specifically provide for the devolution of
validly disclaimed property.0 Under state law, the interest
will shift only if the disclaimer is authorized by the state's
statutory scheme or common law.10 If the disclaimer is not so
authorized, the property is deemed to have been vested in the
disclaimant." Any subsequent disposition will be considered a
transfer by the disclaimant independent of the disclaimer.61
Consequently, the purported disclaimant would have incurred
a federal gift tax.'$ If the purported disclaimant, B, were dom-
iciled in a jurisdiction which did not permit disclaimer of in-
testate shares, the interest would have vested immediately in
B." The transfer of property interests from B to his children
would be taxable. On the other hand, if the particular juris-
diction allowed intestate share disclaimers, the interest would
have passed to B's children without a gift tax imposition. 6
The foregoing examples demonstrate that deference to
state law endured through the original enactment of section
2518 and, consequently, the common law's unequal treatment
of taxpayers persisted. Congress has recently enacted an
amendment to section 2 5 18 ,66 via the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981, 67 which may change this result.
B. The 1981 Amendment: Subsection 2518(c)(3)
The basic motive behind adding section 2518(c)(3) was to
erty. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
59. See Frimmer, supra note 2, at 821-23 nn.37, 40 (citing the states which have
enacted disclaimer statutes).
60. For a discussion of the effect of a disclaimer, see supra notes 5-7 and ac-
companying text.
61. See Hardenberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 836 (1952); Maxwell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952); Lauritzen, Only
God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 568-69 (1953); Newman & Kalter, The
Need for Disclaimer Legislation: An Analysis of the Background of Current Law, 28
TAx LAW. 571 (1975).
62. Once the interest has vested, the disclaimant is deemed to have accepted
the property. When the interest passes, it passes at the direction of the disclaimant
and the disclaimer statute is violated. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (1976).
63. See I.R.C. § 2518.
64. See sources cited supra note 61.
65. Most states enacting disclaimer legislation have provided for intestate share
disclaimer. See Frimmer, supra note 2, at 811, 822 n.41 (citing statutes specifically
providing for intestate share disclaimer).
66. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (1981).
67. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 to
1188 [Vol. 22
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achieve a uniform federal standard of disclaimer application."
Section 2518 now permits a disclaimant to transfer the prop-
erty to certain designated transferees without otherwise vio-
lating the statute. 9 In effect, the amendment disregards state
law for purposes of determining disclaimer validity.
Section 2518(c)(3) permits the shifting of a property in-
terest to "the person or persons who would have received the
property had the person made a qualified disclaimer within
the meaning of subsection (b)."70 The disclaimant is no longer
deemed to retain possession or control of the interest and the
"passing" requirement can now be satisfied without looking to
state law for guidance. 71 The amendment mandates further,
that the property is to be transferred to a statute determined
taker, which leaves no possibility for the disclaimant to choose
the taker. The disclaimant merely performs a ministerial
function in the transfer, and the interest passes "without di-
rection on the part of the disclaimant. '7 1 The Senate report
further indicates that the disclaimant can direct the property
interest to the person who would have taken under local law
without being deemed to have accepted the property."'
By providing for a shifting of disclaimed property, Con-
gress abrogated deference to state law with regard to the dev-
olution of property interests. A disclaimant can now perfect
68. The Senate Report states:
Prior to the enactment of section 2518, the effect of a disclaimer, for
Federal estate and gift tax purposes, depended on its validity under ap-
plicable local law. When Congress enacted section 2518, it intended a
uniform Federal standard so that a disclaimer would be valid for Fed-
eral estate and gift tax purposes whether or not valid under local law.
Under section 2518, however, because the disclaimer must be effec-
tive to divest the disclaimant of ownership, and pass the interest with-
out direction on the part of the person making the disclaimer, the dis-
claimer must still satisfy local law. Because applicable law varies from
State to State, there is still no uniformity.
The committee believes that a disclaimant should be able to perfect
an otherwise valid disclaimer by directing that the interest pass to the
person who would have received the property had the refusal been effec-
tive under local law.
S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 142, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws 105, 241-42.
69. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (West Supp. 1981).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (1976).
73. See S. REP. No. 97-144, Cong., 1st Sess. 142 reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 105, 242.
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an otherwise valid disclaimer by transferring the disclaimed
interest to the substituted taker designated by the statute.
The statute, however, is still not completely devoid of incon-
sistencies and uncertainties.
IV. AMENDED SECTION 2518 INCONSISTENCIES AND
UNCERTAINTIES
Although subsection 2518(c)(3) has finally set aside defer-
ence to state law, it has not entirely resolved the issue of une-
qual treatment of taxpayers. The IRS interpretation of the
statute and the uncertainty surrounding the determination of
the proper transferee may still lead to possible divergent
treatment of disclaimants.
A. Statute Inconsistencies
State law is no longer responsible for the unequal treat-
ment of disclaimants. The IRS has interpreted section 2518,
however, in a manner that confers less favorable treatment
upon certain taxpayers depending upon their status.7 4 Dis-
crepancies exist with respect to a fiduciary-beneficiary
disclaimant, a partial interest disclaimant, or a power of ap-
pointment recipient.
1. Fiduciary-Beneficiary Disclaimants
The IRS states that for federal tax purposes a beneficial
interest in a trust may be disclaimed so long as discretionary
powers to direct the enjoyment of the disclaimed property in-
terest are not retained.7 5 This restriction applies whether the
fiduciary-beneficiary relationship is in relation to one trust or
whether the fiduciary obligation is in relation to a trust in
which the disclaimed beneficial interest passes .7 For instance,
B disclaims his beneficial interest in Whiteacre, which then
falls into a residuary trust. If B has the power to invade, en-
croach, or allocate the residuary trust income or corpus, he is
deemed to have accepted the interest and the disclaimer is
74. Proposed Tress. Reg. § 2518 (1980). The proposed regulations, specifically
those mentioned in the text, have been under attack by several commentators. See
supra note 43.





The above result is inconsistent with the 1978 technical
amendment to section 2518(b)(4) which allows qualification of
a disclaimed interest passing to the surviving spouse78 under
both a "marital"7 9  and "nonmarital" 80  trust. The
"nonmarital" trust frequently provides that: (1) the surviving
spouse be the initial trustee; (2) the spouse receive income for
life; and (3) the trustee distribute the corpus to the spouse for
her support and maintenance or that the spouse be able to
withdraw up to the greater of five percent of the corpus or
$5,000 dollars in any calendar year. 1 The IRS will not allow a
surviving spouse holding an interest in such a trust to dis-
claim a portion of the "marital" trust which would fall into
the "nonmarital" trust, unless the surviving spouse also re-
nounces her trusteeship and the right to withdraw the annual
amount. Despite congressional intent to the contrary, many
spouses will not be able to "take advantage of section
2518(b)(4)(A) without [a] disclaimer of important interests
under the 'nonmarital' trust.
' s2
One commentator has argued that the regulations reach
incorrect results. Disclaimer of a beneficial interest in prop-
erty or in a trust should not preclude that individual from
acting as a fiduciary, even if the individual has the power to
direct the disposition of the disclaimed property or interest in
his fiduciary capacity. 83 The commentator supports his con-
clusion by pointing to legislative history and to the statute it-
self. There is no language in the legislative history which can
be construed to prohibit direction by a fiduciary." He argues
77. Id.
78. See supra note 41. The General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978
provides that the surviving spouse may retain "an income interest or other interest"
in the trust (emphasis added). JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 95th Cong., 2d Seas.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE AcT OF 1978 443 (Comm. print 1979).
79. The "marital trust" consists of the surviving spouse's interest in community
and separate property which interest is held in trust for the surviving spouse's bene-
fit. The surviving spouse has the freedom to appoint these assets as she or he chooses.
The decedent's estate obtains a marital deduction in an amount equal to the value of
the assets.
80. "Nonmarital" signifies a trust which is set up for the benefit of both the
surviving spouse and the couple's children. It is also commonly referred to as a "fam-
ily trust."
81. I.R.C. § 2041 and attendant regulations.
82. Carrico, supra note 43, at § 3.
83. Frimmer, supra note 43, at § 20.
84. Id.
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that section 2518's " without direction" requirement can be
interpreted as relating to the direction "within the disclaimer
itself, and not a direction which arises after the disclaimer." 85
Recent IRS rulings have, nevertheless, corroborated the
regulations. One taxpayer who resigned as trustee in her chil-
dren's trust was permitted to disclaim her interest in a mari-
tal trust even though she had been the trustee of a living revo-
cable trust in the same property and had received benefits
therefrom." Another individual renounced his beneficial in-
terests in a testamentary trust as well as all executor and trus-
tee discretionary powers. 87 The IRS, in effect, will differenti-
ate between fiduciaries to the extent that beneficial interests
are also involved. The ability to continue to perform fiduciary
obligations will depend largely on the beneficial status of the
fiduciary in a particular trust.
Under California law, trustee powers might not be a
proper disclaimer subject. California Civil Code section 225888
mandates the trustee to obey the trust declarations. This sug-
gests an all or nothing approach: A trustee cannot renounce
only part of his duties unless the trust instrument so provides.
All powers, whether discretionary or purely administrative,
must be disclaimed.89 This effectively amounts to a trustee
resignation. Thus, the options available to a fiduciary-benefi-
ciary under the California Civil Code are either to resign com-
pletely as the trustee of the trust or to incur a gift tax. It ap-
pears from this that validity of a disclaimer of a beneficial
interest paired with fiduciary obligations may still be depen-
dent on the particular state's law. This leads to divergent
treatment of taxpayers.
2. Partial Interest Disclaimers
In determining whether a disclaimer of less than an entire
interest qualifies, a distinction is made between nontrust and
trust assets. For nontrust assets, a beneficial income interest
in property is treated as one interest and a beneficial interest
in the corpus as another. For trust assets, all income and
85. Id.
86. Letter Ruling 8134216 (6-1-81).
87. Letter Ruling 8143053 (7-29-81).




corpus interests are a single collective interest."
When a disclaimant who holds more than one piece of the
same type of property attempts to disclaim less than his col-
lective interest, the validity of the disclaimer depends on
whether the property is held in trust. For example, if benefi-
ciary B is devised two pieces of income producing property, he
can disclaim the income from one piece of property and con-
tinue to receive income from the other. But if instead the
properties are held in trust for B's benefit, he cannot disclaim
income from one piece of trust property while keeping the in-
come from the other.9
This distinction is most significant when a beneficiary is
given a combination of interests or powers" over the corpus.
Four interests or powers can be included in the combination:
(1) A testamentary power of appointment over the corpus; (2)
a power to withdraw a stated percentage of the corpus annu-
ally; (3) a power limited by any standard; and (4) a right to
receive additional corpus at the trustee's discretion.93 The ex-
amples in the proposed section 2518(3)(c) regulations indicate
that when a combination of interests is involved, all powers
must be disclaimed in order to have an effective disclaimer."
Thus, if B is a permissible appointee under the trustee's dis-
cretionary power of invasion and B also has a general testa-
mentary power of appointment over the corpus, both interests
are treated collectively as one and B must disclaim both.' 5
This regulation, which requires disclaimer of all corpus
interests, is contrary to an earlier IRS ruling." A beneficiary
was permitted to disclaim a limited testamentary power of ap-
pointment even though he retained the right to receive discre-
tionary distributions of trust income and principal.'7 Com-
mentators have argued that this former position is correct.' 8
90. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-3(a)(2) (1980).
91. Id.
92. The term "power" is synonymous with "interest." Section 2518 (c)(2) pro-
vides that "a power with respect to property shall be treated as an interest in such
property." I.R.C. § 2518(c)(2) (1976).
93. See I.R.C. § 2041 and attendant regulations.
94. Proposed Trees. Reg. § 25.2518-(3)(c) examples 9-12.
95. Id. at example 11.
96. Letter Ruling 7803065 (10-31-77).
97. Id.
98. See American Bar Association, supra note 43, at 23-26; Frimmer, supra
note 43, at § C(1).
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They have attacked the proposed regulations on the grounds
that section 2518(c)(2) provides that "a power with respect to
property shall be treated as an interest in such property""'
and that section 2518(b) allows an interest in property to be
disclaimed. 100 The regulation dealing with powers of appoint-
ment clearly indicates that a power constitutes a separate
property interest.1' 1
Nevertheless, the IRS position presently controls. The va-
lidity of a partial interest disclaimer depends on whether an
identical interest in property is held in trust for or given out-
right to a beneficiary. This distinction, much like the common
law distinction accorded testate and intestate shares, 10 2 has no
logical basis and should be discarded.
3. Power of Appointment Beneficiaries
The IRS also distinguishes between the takers of a special
and general power of appointment. 03 In both cases, the do-
nees of the power must disclaim within nine months of the
power's creation. 10 4 For appointees and takers in default of a
general power of appointment the period for making the dis-
claimer begins to run after the holder has exercised the power
or upon its lapse. 08 The permissible appointees and takers in
default of a special power of appointment are given less
favorable treatment. They are regarded as contingent benefi-
ciaries'06 and their disclaimer period begins to run upon crea-
tion of the special power of appointment. 07
The dissimilar treatment of the permissible appointee of
general and special powers of appointment can produce harsh
results. A special power of appointment can be exercised in
favor of anyone except the holder of the power, his estate, his
creditors, and his estate's creditors. 08 In the case of a very
broad power, a permissible appointee may not even be in exis-
99. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(2) (1976).
100. Id. at (b).
101. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(6)(ii) (1958).
102. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
103. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518(c)(2) (1980).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
time limit on life estates and succeeding interests.
107. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518(c).
108. I.R.C. § 2041(b) (1976).
1194 [Vol. 22
DISCLAIMERS
tence at the time the power is granted. For example, a donee
may be granted a power to appoint to her children's spouses.
If the children are not married and do not become married
within the nine month statutory disclaimer period following
award of the power to the donee, the future spouses would be
unable to disclaim. But a different result follows if the donee
is also a permissible appointee; the power could then be
deemed a general power of appointment.' 09 The future
spouses of the donee's children or the takers in default do not
have to disclaim until the donee either appoints to the
spouses or until the interest passes to the takers in default
upon lapse.110 The permissible appointees of a general power
of appointment are, in effect, granted the right to disclaim al-
though the permissible appointees of a special power are not.
The above situations demonstrate that while deference to
state law has been abrogated, the unequal treatment of tax-
payers still persists. Section 2518 not only fails to completely
resolve this problem, but actually creates new issues and un-
certainties regarding the determination of the proper
transferee.
B. Statute Uncertainties
1. Determining the Transferee
Under subsection 2518(c)(3), an interest in property may
be validly disclaimed for federal tax purposes if the disclaimer
is made with respect to the entire interest prior to acceptance
of the interest.1 As long as the requirements of subsection
(b)(2) and (3)112 are met, the disclaimer will be upheld
whether or not state standards have been satisfied.113 Subsec-
tion 2518(c)(3) allows an individual to make a valid disclaimer
of intestate shares even in jurisdictions where such a dis-
claimer is not authorized. It is still unclear, however, who
should receive the disclaimed interest.
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended
to defer to state law: "State disclaimer rules will be used to
109. The nonholders would then get preferential treatment. Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 25.2518-2(c).
110. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c).
111. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (West Supp. 1981).
112. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(2)-(3) (1976).
113. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (West Supp. 1981).
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determine the transferee. '114 To reiterate, section 2518(c)(3)
will only validate a disclaimer if the property is transferred to
the "persons who would have received the property had the
disclaimer been qualified under the meaning of subsection
(b)."" 5 In order to qualify under subsection (b), the dis-
claimer must be valid under local law." 6 In this respect, defer-
ence to state law persists.
When federal and state law both authorize the disclaimer,
no problems will arise. The property passes under the state's
succession law. In California, for example, the interest "shall
descend, go, be distributed, or continue to be held as if the
beneficiary disclaiming had predeceased the person creating
the interest," unless a will or another dispositive instrument
provides otherwise." 7
When state law invalidates the disclaimer, determination
of the transferee is unclear. This uncertainty might arise when
a person purports to disclaim an intestate share, a joint own-
ership interest, life insurance and annuity proceeds, or where
state and federal disclaimer time limits do not coincide. State
statutes do not generally provide for property devolution in
the event that the disclaimer fails.'" The property is simply
deemed to have been vested in the disclaimant amounting to
an acceptance on his part. Any subsequent disposition will
give rise to tax consequences. The foregoing interests, previ-
ously the cause of uncertainty as to disclaimer validity,"' are
now the cause of uncertainty in determining the post-dis-
claimer transferee.
2. Joint Ownership
The proposed section 2518 regulations state that an inter-
est in joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety can be effec-
tively disclaimed if: (1) Made with respect to the entire prop-
erty interest; (2) made within nine months of creation of the
tenancy; and (3) the disclaimer covers the disclaimant's prop-
114. S. REP. No. 97-144, 97 Cong., 2d Sess. 142, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS. 105, 242.
115. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3).
116. I.R.C. § 2518(b)(4) (1976). See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
117. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.6 (West Supp. 1982). See infra notes 159-61 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of the code section.
118. See, e.g., id. at §§ 190-190.10.
119. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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erty interest, not just the right of survivorship.'2 0 An excep-
tion is made with respect to joint tenancy bank accounts."'
Since bank accounts are revocable in nature, the interest does
not vest until the joint tenant's death. Consequently, a dis-
claimer can be made within nine months of the contributing
joint tenant's death rather than within nine months of the
joint interest creation. 122
While the proposed regulations do not address the situa-
tion in which the contributing joint tenant is the disclaimant,
several letter rulings indicate that the IRS would not support
such a disclaimer. In one instance,2 s the disclaimant had cre-
ated two joint bank accounts during the decedent transferee's
lifetime. The IRS disallowed the disclaimer because the dis-
claimant had been the sole contributor. In so ruling, the IRS
stated that the disclaimer would be valid under section 2518 if
made by the donee or the transferee of the interest. 2 '
There exists very little case law authority supporting dis-
claimer of joint tenancy property. The few existing cases
reach contrary results. 25 In California, a joint tenancy vests
title in the joint tenants immediately upon creation of the in-
terest."2 6 This is similar to the vesting of intestate property.
The California Probate Code provides for disclaimer of intes-
tate shares, but it does not specifically refer to joint tenan-
120. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(3) (1980).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Letter Ruling 8130069 (4-21-81).
124. Id. See also Letter Ruling 8124118 (3-29-81) in which the IRS allowed a
husband to disclaim his deceased spouse's one-half interest in a joint bank account
instituted nine months prior to the deceased joint tenant's death. The joint tenancy
bank account was revocable and did not become irrevocable until the joint tenant's
death. The IRS assumed that joint tenancies were community property in California
and that such interests were disclaimable under state law.
125. See Krakoff v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1970) afl'd, 439
F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1971) (Both husband and wife signed signature cards on the bank
accounts and made occasional deposits and withdrawals. The disclaimer was disal-
lowed because the surviving joint tenant had had knowledge of the joint tenancy
since its creation). Cf. Hershey v. Bowers, 7 Ohio St. 2d 4, 218 N.E. 2d 455 (1966)
(The court permitted the surviving joint tenant's disclaimer subsequent to the other
joint tenant's death because the surviving joint tenant did not know about the joint
tenancy until after the death).
126. CAL. CIv. CODE § 683 (West 1972). See Hardenberg v. Commissioner, 198
F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952); Neil v. Ross, 101 F.2d 153
(9th Cir. 1939) (the legal effect of a joint tenancy is to vest title to property in the
joint tenants); Maxwell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952); Lauritzen, supra note
61, at 568-69.
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cies.'27 Thus, the statute may be construed as precluding joint
tenancy disclaimers. To whom will the property in this case be
directed?
It has been argued that joint tenancies should be dis-
claimed interests because they are analogous to a testamen-
tary transfer.128 At least one state views a joint tenancy inter-
est as being merely a contractual right because the non-
contributing tenant in that state has no equitable interests
until the death of the first joint tenant.' 29 In keeping with
those views, "the joint tenancy property should be excepted
from the 'acceptance' provision until the death of the first
joint tenant."'80 In any event, a spouse's ability to make a
valid disclaimer is very limited.'31 Joint tenancies should be
proper subjects of a disclaimer, however, because the creation
of the interest is basically indistinguishable from a gift.' 82
3. Life Insurance and Annuity Proceeds
Prior to a 1982 amendment, because the California Pro-
bate Code made no specific provision for disclaimer of life in-
surance or annuity proceeds, it was doubtful whether such a
disclaimer would be effective under California law.' The pro-
posed IRS regulations specifically allow disclaimers of such in-
terests if the disclaimant refrains from exercising sufficient
control over the proceeds.' 34 For example, the primary benefi-
ciary may, under federal law, validly direct the insurance or
annuity company to hold the proceeds at interest during the
disclaimant's lifetime and to pay the principal upon the
127. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190 (West Supp. 1982). Assembly Bill No. 769 recently
amended the probate code to allow disclaimer of five additional interests, among
which are included joint tenancies and life insurance and annuity proceeds. 1982 CAL.
LEGIS. SERV. ch. 41 (to be codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 190). However, since the old
code is more representative of most state statutes, it will be used as an illustration of
inconsistencies prevalent between state and federal law.
128. See Frimmer, supra note 2, at 831-32; and note 43, at § B(21).
129. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (1976); see Note, supra note 1, at 60 nn.167-69.
130. Frimmer, supra note 43, at § B(21).
131. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(3) (1980).
132. One commentator states, "[t]he initial creation of joint tenancy by the per-
son in favor of another may be the subject of a disclaimer because the transfer is
nothing more than a gift." Frimmer, supra note 2, at 831. See Note, supra note 1, at
60 nn.168-69.
133. See supra note 127. See also Frimmer, supra note 2, at 829-31, Comment,
supra note 1, at 226.
134. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-4 (1980).
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disclaimant's death to the disclaimant's designee.'35 When
this inconsistency between federal and state law arises, to
whom will the property pass? Again, commentators contend
that an insurance contract closely resembles a testamentary
transfer and should be treated accordingly.1
3 6
4. Time Limitations
Inconsistencies between federal and state law concerning
disclaimer time limitations may also lead to uncertainties in
the determination of the subsequent transferee. For federal
tax purposes, an effective disclaimer must be made no later
than nine months after creation of the interest or after the
disclaimant has obtained age twenty-one. 37 The IRS con-
strues the disclaimer period for gift tax purpose to begin run-
ning when the transfer becomes complete. For testamentary
transfers, the disclaimer period begins to run at the date of
the testator's death. 38 When there is a transfer of income for
life with succeeding interests to other persons, both the life
tenant and the succeeding takers, whether their interests are
vested or contingent, must disclaim within nine months of the
original taxable transfer.3 9
In contrast, the California legislature established a "rea-
sonable time requirement" of nine months after the death of
the person creating the interest or, in the case of inter vivos
trusts, within nine months after the interest becomes indefea-
sibly vested. 140 Contingent remaindermen do not have to dis-
claim until the preceding tenant's1 4 1 death. The new federal
law, therefore, preempts the California statute, because the
federal law determines the maximum limit for a valid dis-
claimer and the state time limit exceeds the federal. In states
where the time limit is shorter than the federal limit, however,
the disclaimer could be valid for federal tax purposes but inef-
fective under state law. This conflict again leads to the ques-
135. Id. Prior cases are in accord. See Rundel v. Welch, 184 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.
Ohio 1960); Estate of Tuohy v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 245 (1950); Estate of Morton v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 380 (1949).
136. Frimmer, supra note 2, at 829; L. NEWMAN & A. KALTER, POSTMORTEM ES-
TATE PLANNING 32 (1976).
137. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(1) (1980).
138. Id. at (c)(2).
139. Id.
140. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1982).
141. Id.
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tion of who will be the transferee.
Federal and state law also clash over the federal excep-
tion to the nine month time limitation which is given to mi-
nors. Federal law gives minors the opportunity to disclaim an
interest in property within nine months after reaching age
twenty-one unless the minor retains a property ownership in-
terest. 42 The problem of ascertaining the property transferee
arises when the minor's disclaimer meets the federal standard
but does not comply with state law. For example, when D is
age ten, a trust is set up for his benefit. D is given the power
to compel the trustee to make distributions for his support,
comfort, maintenance, and welfare. At age nineteen, D
presents the trustee with his college bill. Upon reaching age
twenty-one, D chooses to disclaim his interest in the trust.
The delay between the time of interest creation and the dis-
claimer may constitute an unreasonable length of time in Cal-
ifornia and the disclaimer may consequently fail."" If this is
not considered an acceptance for federal tax purposes, deter-
mining the alternate taker becomes an issue.'44
The foregoing examples are typical of the differences that
exist between federal and state law. Where a disclaimer, sanc-
tioned under federal law, is not authorized under the state's
disclaimer statute, problems in determining the substitute
transferee will arise because states do not make provisions for
ineffective disclaimers. Since Congress has deferred to state
law in determining the substitute transferee, questions remain
as to whom the property interests will pass: To the disclaim-
ant's estate, to alternate beneficiaries under life insurance pol-
icies or annuity contracts, or to the decedent transferor's es-
tate? The interpretation of section 2518's language, passage of
new disclaimer legislation, and careful estate planning may
provide solutions to the remaining inconsistencies and uncer-
tainties of section 2518.
142. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(1)(ii) (1980).
143. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1982).
144. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(d)(iii) example 6. The example indi-
cates that the disclaimer would also fail for federal tax purposes. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3),
however, disregards local law in determining the validity of a disclaimer. As long as
the minor disclaims within nine months after reaching age twenty-one, therefore, the
federal statute should be satisfied.
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V. SECTION 2518 CLARIFICATION
The dissimilar treatment of taxpayers according to their
place of domicile has not been totally removed by the 1981
amendment to section 2518. Inconsistencies within the stat-
ute, largely due to IRS interpretation, and the uncertainty of
substitute transferee determination may still lead to varying
tax consequences for individuals under similar circumstances.
These differences, however, may be substantially eliminated
through alteration of the proposed IRS regulations, state leg-
islation, and estate planning.
A. The IRS Interpretation of Section 2518
The statute's inconsistencies are not a direct result of the
language itself, but rather are due to IRS interpretations.
Commentators have attacked the proposed regulations on the
basis that neither the legislative history nor the statute itself
supports these illogical interpretations. 5 The legislative his-
tory cannot be construed to include fiduciaries under the dis-
claimer rules." The distinction between trust and nontrust
assets is most acute with respect to the corpus of a trust since
different powers over the corpus can be conferred upon a ben-
eficiary. 17 This distinction is unsound, because the statute it-
self treats powers as separate property interests.' 8 The dis-
tinction between permissible appointees of general and special
powers of appointment is not only unsound, but also unfair.
Requiring special power appointees to disclaim within nine
months of creation of the power while allowing general power
appointees to disclaim within nine months after exercise or
lapse of the power is undoubtedly unequal treatment." 9 Both
powers can be very broad and the effect is to produce harsh
tax results.5 0 An equitable solution would be to allow both
sets of nonholders to disclaim within nine months of either
exercise or lapse of the power.
Hearings on the proposed regulations have been held at
which comments similar to those discussed above have been
145. See supra notes 83-85, 98-101, 108-09 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
148. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(2) (1976).
149. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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heard. The proposed regulations have been severely criticized.
The final regulations may, therefore, reflect changes which
give taxpayers more equitable treatment. If this in fact is the
case, the only problem left for resolution is the determination
of a transferee.
B. Determining the Transferee
Congress has placed upon the states the responsibility of
determining the proper post-disclaimer transferee.1 5' The lan-
guage of section 2518(c)(3) furnishes a clue to fixing the
proper substitute taker. A disclaimer will be enforced if the
property is transferred to the individual who would have re-
ceived the property had the disclaimer been effective under
state law. 52 For all practical purposes, a disclaimer is to pass
under the state's regular disclaimer provisions. In California,
for example, the interest will pass as "if the disclaimant had
predeceased the person creating the interest.' 53 The interest
will pass according to the lapsed gifts and anti-lapse stat-
utes.1 5" These statutes direct either that the interest pass to
the disclaimant's lineal descendants155 or, in the alternative,
that the gift falls into the residuum and go to the residuary
legatee or devisee."' If the testator's will does not contain a
residuary clause, the testator dies intestate as to that gift and
it passes to the testator's heirs.157 The possibility of a will con-
test further complicates matters. In order to avoid this confu-
sion, the property interest should be delivered to the testa-
tor's estate by the disclaimant so that it can ultimately pass to
the proper transferee.
Most states' disclaimer statutes are similar to Califor-
nia's; they apply only in the event that the transferor has not
made provisions to account for disclaimed property. 58 The
transferor can himself name the substitute taker to avoid the
problem of who is to receive a disclaimed property interest.
151. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
152. I.R.C. § 2518(c)(3) (West Supp. 1981).
153. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.6 (West Supp. 1982).
154. CAL. PROB. CODE § 92 (West 1956). See 7 WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA




158. CAL. PROB. CODE § 190.6 (West Supp. 1982).
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Legislators may also be instrumental in reducing the
transferee determination uncertainty. Section 2518 now spe-
cifically permits disclaimers of certain property interests
which have been questionable in the past.15 9 States may, con-
sequently, be encouraged to adopt legislation conforming to
the federal standard. Recently adopted California legislation,
for example, expressly enumerates five additional interests
which may be disclaimed, 60 including, among others, joint
tenancies and proceeds from life insurance and annuity con-
tracts. All interests disclaimable under federal law can also be
disclaimed in California."' Since the California statute now
largely parallels the federal standard, the uncertainties cre-
ated by conflicting state and federal disclaimer validity stan-
dards have been substantially eliminated.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 has decidely abro-
gated the original section 2518 deference to state disclaimer
law. Section 2518(c)(3) provides a method of disclaiming
property irrespective of its characterization under state law.
The new subsection, however, has failed entirely to resolve the
unequal treatment of taxpayers. Inconsistencies within the
statute itself, due largely to IRS interpretation, continue to
accord disclaimants dissimilar treatment. These inconsisten-
cies have been the subject of much controversy and the final
regulations may incorporate changes that will treat disclai-
mants more equitably.
Subsection 2518(c)(3) has created new uncertainties
which surround post-disclaimer transferee determination.
This determination, to be made at the state level, may lead to
various interpretations of who is to be deemed the ultimate
transferee. Estate planners should, consequently, anticipate
the possibility of a disclaimer to avoid potential property dev-
olution problems by incorporating provisions in wills for post-
disclaimer transferees. In addition, the enactment of section
2518(c)(3) may give impetus to serious consideration of adopt-
159. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c) (1980) (providing for disclaimers
of joint tenancies); id. at 4 (providing for a disclaimer of life insurance and annuity
proceeds).
160. 1982 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 41 (to be codified at CAL. PROB. CODE § 190).
161. Id.
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ing legislation parallel to the federal standard which would
eliminate the question of who is the proper post-disclaimer
transferee.
Emma Peha
